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Abstract
This paper examines Kahneman and Tversky’s standard explanation for preference reversal
due to framing effects in the famous BAsian flu^ case. It argues that, alongside with their Bloss/
no gain effect^ account, an alternative interpretation, still consistent with the empirical data,
amounts to a more reasonable psychological explanation for the preference reversal. Specif-
ically, my hypothesis is that shifts in the baseline induce shifts in the agents’ classification of
the same action as Bdoing harm^ rather than Ballowing harm to occur^, and that people are
risk-seeking when it comes to avoid causing extra deaths–doing harm–and risk-averse when it
comes to preventing more deaths–by the means of allowing other deaths to occur as a side
effect. I then survey the two most influential concurrent accounts in the moral literature, with
respect to the relation between the loss/no gain and the doing/allowing distinction: Horowitz’s
reductionist conclusion, which argues that the latter collapses into the former, and Kamm’s
rebuttal, which claims instead that the two distinctions can be pulled apart. I eventually explain
why my interpretation differs from both these positions.
Keywords Doing and allowing . Prospect theory . Loss/no gain effect . Endowment effect
1 Introduction
Imagine you are faced with the following dilemma:
Your city is threatened by an BAsian flu^ which is expected to kill 600 people, and you
have to make a choice between these two alternative vaccination programs.
& If Program A is adopted, 200 people out of the 600 will be saved.
& If Program B is adopted, there is 2/3 probability that no-one will be saved, and 1/3
probability that all 600 people will be saved.
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Which program would you choose?
Imagine now that, in the very same scenario, you could choose instead between C and D:
& If Program C is adopted, 400 people out of the 600 will die.
& If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that no-one will die, and 2/3 probability
that 600 people will die.
What would be your decision this time?
If your choices were A and D respectively, your answers fit the experimental results
famously discussed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in their 1983 paper BChoice,
Values, and Frames^.1 The authors presented two groups of subjects with the same decision
problem, but phrased in different forms; specifically, the first group had to choose between A
and B and the second group between C and D. A and C, like B and D, are however
extensionally equivalent, and describe the same vaccination program: B200 people will be
saved and 400 will die^ (A and C) and Bthere is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved
and no-one will die and a 2/3 probability that no-one will be saved and 600 people will die^ (B
and D). Therefore, we could reasonably expect that the percentage of people opting for A and
C (or for B and D) were similar in the first and the second group. Nonetheless, experimental
findings showed that 72% of subjects in the first group chose Program A but, in the second
group, 78% of subjects chose Program D.2
With the BAsian flu^ case, together with other experimental findings, K&T brought
attention for the first time to subjects’ conflicting choices when it comes to deciding over
the same options described differently. K&T thus argue that, while making decisions, people
are affected by how the decision problem is framed. More accurately, they suggest that, by
setting a different reference point, two extensionally equivalent decision problems can trigger
some amount to be perceived as either a potential gain or a potential loss (which is, in the
BAsian flu^ case, the amount of lives saved or lost). As people tend to show opposite risk
attitudes with respect to gains and losses, they reverse their preferences depending on whether
the outcomes are described as losses rather than gains from the reference point.
More technically, K&Tshow that value functions are usually convex for losses and concave
for gains, and steeper for losses than for gains, and thus claim that shifts in the baseline can
cause preference reversals. With respect to risk attitudes, this means that decision makers are
more risk seeking when it comes to avoid a (perceived) loss with respect to the reference point,
and more risk averse when it comes to pursue a (perceived) gain with respect to the reference
point. The shift in the reference point can thus motivate different behaviours and result into
preference reversal. Furthermore, K&T try to identify the psychological mechanism behind
these risk attitudes as the Bendowment effect^ of the baseline.3 By endowment effect, in
psychology and behavioural economics, we mean the tendency to ascribe more value to things
merely because we own them or, more generally, by the tendency to normativize the reference
1 In American Psychologist, 39(4), pp. 341–350. From now on, BK&T^ will refer to Kahneman and Tversky’s
positions in this specific paper.
2 In their experiment, K&T did not ask the same person to choose between A and B and C and D, but rather
divided the subjects into two groups. The reader, therefore, can not be put in the same experimental setting
designed by the authors, as she can not evaluate the two prospects independently. We could still reason about this
case thinking whether we have a different perception of the health plans described, and whether our intuitions
over the two decision problems differ.
3 See, in addition to the 1983 paper, Kahneman et al. (1991).
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point, i.e., assigning to the features of the situation described as the baseline a normative status.4
In this paper I first describe in detail how, according to K&T, the endowment effect of the
baseline can explain the preference reversal in the BAsian flu^ case (section 1). I then argue
that, in the BAsian flu^ case, K&T’s experimental results are consistent as well with the
following interpretation: shifts in the baseline induce shifts in the agents’ classification of the
same action as an instance of Bdoing harm^ rather than Ballowing harm to occur^ (section 2).
My claim is that people are risk seeking when it comes to avoid causing extra deaths– doing
harm– and risk averse when it comes to preventing more deaths– by the means of allowing
other deaths to occur. In short, I suggest, the same patterns in value functions call for a different
psychological explanation, and agents are not only motivated by the perception of the same
amount of lives as losses or gains with respect to the reference point. Alternatively, I argue that,
in this example, the different risk attitudes could depend on the fact that people have different
moral intuitions over the permissibility of doing harm and allowing the same harm to occur. As
a result, when the reference point triggers different interpretation of the same action as
Bdoing^ rather than Ballowing^, this, in turn, brings about different preferences over
the two decision problems.
The relation between the doing/allowing distinction and the loss/no gain effect has been
widely discussed in the moral literature. Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) and Horowitz (1998), for
instance, argue that cases like the BAsian flu^ show that the distinction between doing and
allowing collapses into the loss/no gain distinction, and could thus be expressed in purely non-
moral terms, as the result of different risk attitudes individuals exhibit with respect to losses
and gains, together with agents’ sensitivity to framing. Arguably, as Kamm (2007) notices, this
conclusion would threaten the significance and relevance of the doing/allowing distinction in
moral theory. In order to challenge this position, she claims that a) the loss/no gain and doing/
allowing distinctions do not coincide; and b) doing/allowing classifications are not subject to
the same framing effects as loss/no gains perceptions are. In this paper, I do not address the
entire doing/allowing debate, but I focus instead on the specific BAsian flu^ example, trying to
clarify my interpretation with respect to Kamm’s account (section 3). First, I argue that my
hypothesis is consistent with Kamm’s claim a), and thus does not support the conclusion that
the doing/allowing distinction can be only described in terms of losses and gains. On the other
hand, I claim that Kamm’s analysis does not support b), and my interpretation acknowledges
for the possibility that the doing/allowing distinction is subject to framing. Seemingly, the fact
that both the doing/allowing and the loss/no gain distinctions are sensitive to framing effects,
and induce similar risk attitudes, does not by itself exclude the autonomy and independent
significance of the former. In section 4, I conclude with some remarks on how framing-
dependence impacts the moral significance of the doing/allowing distinction.
1.1 K&T’s Interpretation: The Endowment Effect of the Baseline
In the introduction, I outline the two different descriptions of a choice problem agents are faced
with in the BAsian flu^ case, and report the experimental findings. This example is represen-
tative of a class of cases K&T use to theorize the notion of a decision frame. By a decision
frame, the authors refer to Bthe decision- maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and
contingencies associated with a particular choice^.5 Roughly, a decision frame amounts to
4 The endowment effect is defined as such by Horowitz (1998). Also, see Cushman et al. (2008).
5 K&T, p. 455.
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the way a choice problem is described to and perceived by the person who makes the choice.
As Bthe frame that a decision-maker adopts is controlled partly by the formulation of the
problem and partly by the norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decision-maker^,6
the same decision problem will often have several decision frames, even for the same decision
maker (thus holding fixed the personal characteristics and changing only the formulation). In
particular, they notice that, in very many cases, two decision frames do not involve different
factual descriptions of the world, but rather assume a different reference point as the baseline.
By way of elaboration: according to standard expected utility theory, the change in a
decision frame, or, more specifically, a change in the reference point, should be irrelevant to
the choice of a course of action. Against this, K&T point out that decision makers do change
their behaviour depending on the decision frame, as the BAsian flu^ case clearly illustrates.
This violates consistency norms rational decisions should supposedly conform to, as the two
frames are, with respect to standard decision theory, two descriptions of situations that are
identical in all relevant aspects.
Let’s now see in detail how reframing supposedly explains preferences reversal in the BAsian
flu^ case. K&T offer a specific interpretation of individuals’ behaviour, which has become the
standard account in choice theory circles. Specifically, K&T argue that 1) the reference point
matters and 2) people are more risk seeking when it comes to avoid sure losses from a given
baseline, and more risk averse when it comes to pursue gains from a given reference point. In
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and in Kahneman et al. (1990), the difference in risk attitudes
summarized in 2) is further examined and associatedwith a psychological mechanism known as
endowment effect. With the support of further empirical evidence, the authors observe that
agents prefer to avoid losses rather than to acquire equivalent gains, as they seem to value more
an object (or an amount of a given currency) if they already Bown^ it, or they feel somehow
attached or entitled to it; this, arguably, makes it worse for them to lose it with respect to the
enjoyment they would experience in gaining the same object (or amount of currency).7 As a
result, people are less prone to take the risk of improving from the baseline and more prone to
take the same risk to avoid getting worse compared to the baseline. Cases of endowment effect
are ubiquitous, and are usually investigated in bargaining settings, by measuring the agents’
willingness to pay. One famous example of the psychological pull of the endowment effect, for
instance, is the so called Knee example.8 K&T polled subjects to ask an amount of money a) in
compensation for not getting a lost knee back and b) in exchange for losing a knee. The results
show that agents demand more money ex ante (b), i.e., when they are faced with the possibility
of losing their knee, than they demand ex post (a), i.e., when they are told they don’t have a knee
and could get it back. Apparently, this supports the conclusion that they value more the knee
they already have with respect to the knee they would get back, even assuming that the new
knee would be equal to the old one under all respects.
Let’s now take a closer look at how the endowment effect would work as an explanation of
the BAsian flu^ case. In the first decision problem (the choice between A and B), the use of the
phrasing Bsaving^ identifies the 200 lives as a gain, thus seemingly setting the adequate
reference point at Ball 600 people die^. With respect to the baseline Beveryone dies^, choosing
program Awould amount to a sure gain from the reference point. Plan B, on the other hand,
characterises a Bbet^, as it involves evaluating a risky prospect. Specifically, with respect to the
6 K&T, p. 455.
7 Kahneman et al. (1990), p. 195.
8 Kamm (2007) also compares the BAsian flu^ case with the Knee case.
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baseline Beveryone dies^, Plan B could either deliver a bigger gain (all 600 people saved) or just
make no progress at all from the baseline (all 600 die). When it comes to gains, K&T observe,
decision makers tend to be risk averse, and, given the same expected lives saved of A and B,
most opt for plan A, which guarantees a sure gain. In the second decision problem, the different
framing of the decisions triggers a different evaluations of vaccination plans. Plan C, indeed,
apparently presents the option of 400 people dying as a loss, as it uses the phrasing Bdie^; this
description thus sets the baseline at Ball 600 people live^. With respect to this reference point,
Plan C involves therefore a sure loss. Plan D, again, amounts to a bet, where either losses with
respect to the baseline are completely avoided (600 people saved) or a bigger loss could occur
(all 600 people die). While C and D are expected-lives-saved equivalent, decision makers
mostly opt for D, showing a preference reversal when compared to the choice between A and B.
To sum up, different framings select different reference points as the relevant baseline,
namely Beveryone dies^ vs Beveryone lives^, and this, in turn, induces a different perception of
the options as losses rather than gains. Because of the endowment effect, agents would then tend
to normativize the reference point, and to value more the same numbers of lives when they feel
they already Bown^ them (or they feel they are already secured); therefore, people are
supposedly risk seeking when it comes to avoid losing lives which are framed as losses with
respect to the reference point Beveryone lives^, and risk averse when it comes to save lives
which are framed as gains from the reference point Beveryone dies^. Consistently, they would
tend to choose the course of action which involves a chance to completely avoid any loss (plan
D over plan C), but are not as eager to take the same risk to savemore lives (plan A over plan B).
This explanation, arguably, holds for all the cases where shifts in the baseline trigger a
different perception of the same option as a loss from the reference point rather than a no-gain
from a lower reference point. For this reason, the baseline sensitivity observed by K&T is often
referred to as the Bloss/no gain^ effect.
1.2 The BDoing/Allowing Effect^ of the Baseline
In this section, I argue that K&T’s empirical findings are consistent as well with a different
interpretation.
The BAsian flu^ case is in some respects different from other examples surveyed by
Kahneman and Tversky, like the classical Knee case. In the latter, the knee is an object, or,
more accurately, a possession, which agents are merely told to have or to be deprived of,
without any further specification of how the loss is brought about. The former, on the other
hand, involves a choice agents are asked to make, a choice which appeals to a moral sphere
and has an impact over other people’s lives; the focus, arguably, is not just on the end states,
like Bknee^ and Bno knee^, but on how these end states are brought about by the agent’s
decision. While the knee, or its absence, can thus be described as a loss or a gain from a given
baseline, the number of lives saved or lost in the BAsian flu^ example is also intrinsically
related to the specific way the agent behaved and chose among options. At the end of section
1, when describing the endowment effect in the two decision problems, I explained the agents’
attitude towards the baseline as Bowning a life^, or, slightly better Bhaving a life secured^. I
find this characterization, however, not persuasive as an adequate psychological explanation of
the different intuitions we have over the permissibility of the health plans. I argue, therefore,
that an additional element plausibly helps account for the observed choices in the BAsian flu^
case, which acknowledges for the fact that the decision problems involve a moral choice.
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Specifically, my hypothesis is that, in the moral dilemma set by the BAsian flu^ case, agents’
assessment and appraisal of the options on the table depends on whether the latter are perceived as
instances of doing harm rather than of allowing a harm to occur. In this paper, I do not endorse any
particular interpretation of the doing/allowing distinction, and I do not take sides in the ongoing
debate over the legitimacy and role of this dichotomy.9 For the purposes of my analysis, it is
sufficient to notice that, in many circumstances, agents share a strong and widespread intuition that
doing a harm and allowing the same harm to occur amount to different moral conducts, and should
be judged differently. In some pairs of cases, this distinction seems particularly salient: if I am
jogging on the waterfront, I see a person drowning in the pond, and refrain to rescue her, I am
allowing the death of this person by drowning. On the other hand, if I drown someone in the pond,
I am actively doing a harm.10 In this class of examples, the difference between the two behaviours
is seemingly self-evident, as well as the moral value attached to the conducts, as drowning a person
is for most people more wrong than a failure to rescue.
In moral theory, the persistency of this intuition has motivated several attempts to provide a
consistent account of the doing/allowing distinction, and thus justify its employment in moral
judgements. As Woollard (2015) puts it, Bif there is no moral difference between doing and
allowing, then morality must either be far more permissive than we generally suppose –
permitting us to kill to protect our personal projects – or far more demanding – requiring
constant sacrifice from us to save the lives of others^. To be sure, several objections to the
feasibility of this project have been put forward, and no account seems completely successful
in accounting for the moral relevance of the doing/allowing distinction.11 For the limited scope
of this section, however, the question of whether the distinction holds a legitimate moral
significance can be set aside. My point here is that, at least in some decision contexts, the
characterisation of a conduct as Bdoing^ rather than Ballowing^ strikes most agent as evident;
when this distinction is particularly salient, moreover, there is a strong agreement over the fact
that doing harm is worse than allowing it to occur. This overwhelming intuition, arguably,
must be accounted for even if we do not take the doing/allowing distinction as per se morally
significant, but rather tracking other moral categorisations or principles. Whichever the case,
the characterisation of a behaviour as an instance of doing rather than allowing triggers
different moral responses, independently on how these responses are justified.
Having this said, my argument is that the BAsian flu^ example belongs to the class of cases
where the doing/allowing distinction is particularly salient, as, I will argue, the phrasing of the
decision problem appeals to either doing or allowing characterisations. Agents’ appraisal and
evaluation of different courses of actions, therefore, plausibly refers to this deeply-rooted
intuition, and should be discussed and analysed accordingly.
My explanation for the preference reversal in the Asian flu case can be thus summarized as
follows: different framings of the same decision problem can induce a different perception of the
same option as an instance of Bdoing harm^ rather than Bdoing goodwhile allowing some harm as a
side effect^; as agents are influenced by this classification, and regard doing harm as morally worse
than allowing it, they are risk seeking when it comes to avoid doing harm (by causing a certain
amount of deaths), and risk aversewhen it comes to doingmore good, allowing harm as a side effect
(by not saving the same amount of lives). This, eventually, leads to the preference reversal.
9 For a survey of the main different positions in the doing/allowing debate, see Howard-Snyder (2007).
10 For a discussion of this example, see Singer (1997).
11 Famously, this position is upheld by Bennett in Bennett (1997).
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I now test whether this hypothesis can successfully account for a different evaluation of the
choice between A and B and the choice between C and D in the BAsian flu^ case. For plan A
and B, as already discussed, the appropriate baseline seems to amount to a situation where
everyone dies; agents, as K&T argue, tend to take such baseline as the position they find
themselves in. Endorsing plan A, therefore, with respect to this dreadful situation where all 600
people die, arguably appears from the agent’s perspective as actively saving 200 people, and
causing the fact that they will live. On the other hand, the fact that the other 400 people will die
reminds more of a side effect of the good action we are performing: in other words, it sounds
more that we are allowing 400 people to die (for sure, a harm), while causing 200 people to
live. Plan A, in short, may be interpreted as Bdoing good and allowing harm (for sure)^. As for
plan B, agents must take a gamble: they could do even more good, eliminating completely the
chance of even allowing harm, or they can end up allowing more deaths to occur. While
equivalent with respect to expected harm (lives lost), most agents stick to plan A, as they are
risk averse when it comes to doing good, while allowing harm to occur. This, I argue, happens
because, in this specific choice problem, option A is framed as giving the agent the chance to
do something good for sure, with respect to the reference point; the harm that will occur as a
consequence of her choosing A is framed in a way that appeals to Ballowing^, and thus to an
occurrence of harm which is not as wrong as Bdoing^. On the other hand, B could give the
chance of doing even more good, thus reducing the possibility of what is framed as allowing
harm as a side-effect. I claim that agents are not eager to take this risk because this description
frames the harm which will occur as an harm we would be merely Ballowing^. Allowing harm,
however, is not as objectionable as doing it, and this explains why agents are risk averse.
Turning to the choice between C and D, now the appropriate baseline is Beveryone lives^. Plan
C, a vaccination plan described as Bkilling^ 400 individuals, appears in that respect as causing the
death, for sure, of 400 individuals, thus actively harming them. In other words, I argue that the
terms used for the description of Plan C are easily associated with a way of bringing about harm
which is characterised as Bdoing^. D, again, describes a lottery where the agent could end up doing
evenmore harm (600 people die), but also not harming anyone (600 people live). Plan D avoids, in
this sense, Bdoing harm for sure^, which seems inevitable when Plan C is selected. Now, the
framing of the decision problem suggests that the agents would do harm, which is more morally
objectionable than merely allowing it. This difference explains why, in this second decision
problems, agents are risk seekers, and more individuals take the chance to avoid doing harm.12
To sum up, while agents have of course interest in doing good and thus saving people, and
do not want to harm, when the characterisation of the harm reminds more of Ballowing^ they
are more risk averse, because this way of bringing about harm is less morally objectionable.
On the other hand, when the description of the harm appeals to the idea of Bdoing harm^,
agents are more risk seeking, as this seems a particularly wrong moral conduct.
12 It could be interesting to discuss as well our risk attitudes in Bdoing good^. Arguably, they exhibit a
symmetrical pattern with respect to our risk attitudes in Bnot harming^: we feel, indeed, that we have some kind
of obligation to do good, but this is plausibly less stringent than the obligation not to do harm. We may, therefore,
be risk averse when it comes to do (more) good. An interpretation which only relies on our attitudes in doing
good, however, seems to perform worse in explaining both cases- the comparison between A and B and the
comparison between C and D. When the baseline is Beveryone lives^, indeed, it is not clear how we do good by
choosing any of the two options. The distinction between doing and allowing, on the other hand, accommodates
both examples, as it explains that we feel more obliged to avoid doing harm than to avoid allowing harm, because
doing is worse than allowing.
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This interpretation, I argue, is perfectly consistent with the experimental results and risk
attitudes described by K&T, but implements this model with the observation that what seems
to be really subject to framing is not the number of lives/deaths as losses or gains, but rather
whether the same number of lives/deaths is perceived as the result of the agent’s Bdoing harm^
or Ballowing harm^. In this sense, baseline shifts change the perception of the way the agent
brought about the same end-states, rather than the perception of the end-states as gains or
losses. I call this psychological interpretation, which shares all the features and formal
properties of the standard analysis, the Bdoing/allowing effect^ of the baseline. I conclude
that this kind of moral evaluations, rather than the endowment effect, can plausibly motivate
the preference reversal, and that this hypothesis shares at least the same empirical support.
1.3 Loss/no Gain Vs Doing/Allowing
Since K&T’s observations, moral philosophers have been concerned about the import of these
experimental results on the status of moral judgements and ethical principles. Specifically, as
moral classifications and principles are often tested against and inferred from people’s
intuitions in certain situations, the fact that our perception of cases and even choice behaviour
is heavily dependent on framing effects seems to threaten the status and significance of the
former. This reasoning is summarized by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) as the master
argument,13 and, in short, claims the following: if our moral intuitions are formed under
unreliable circumstances, then they are not justified; as framing effects proves the unreliability
of our evaluation of cases, moral intuitions can not be independently justified.
As discussed in section 2, the doing/allowing distinction, together with the moral principle
Bdoing is worse than allowing^, is mostly grounded in people’s judgements and intuitions over
some specific cases and scenarios. In this sense, all theoretical efforts to provide a justification
for the different moral significance we attribute to Bdoing^ and Ballowing^ actions are
motivated by the fact that we persistently employ this distinction in real life. As Sinnott-
Armstrong (2008) and Kamm (2007) argue, however, if our doing/allowing classifications
were the mere result of framing effects, like the endowment effect and the baseline effect, then
this whole justificatory project would become pointless.
The BAsian flu^ case, among other examples, has been used by advocates of this destructive
interpretation as a decisive test14: if Bdoing^ and Ballowing^ attributions collapse into Blosses^
rather than Bno-gains^ framings, then K&T’s analysis provides an explanation of the doing/
allowing distinction in purely non-moral terms and, what is more, as the effect of psychological
attitudes, idiosyncracies and reasoning biases. This position is upheld, in particular, by Tamara
Horowitz, who argues that this example shows that what most people identify as Bdoing harm^
equals to a loss from a given reference point, while what we perceive as Ballowing harm^ amounts
to a Bno gain^ from another reference point. The shift in the baseline, which is amatter of phrasing,
thus induces these different characterisations, which are nothingmore than the effect of the change
in the reference point and the framing of the same amount of lives as losses or no gains.
Before turning to Kamm’s answer to Horowitz, I notice that my position is different from
the one expressed above. While I agree that we may substitute the loss/no gain talk with the
doing/allowing distinction, I do not conclude that the latter can be reduced to the former. On
the other hand, I claim that the BAsian flu^ case presents a moral aspect which can not be
13 Sinnott-Armstrong (2008), pp. 48–56.
14 This characterisation is upheld in Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) and Horowitz (1998).
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adequately captured by the endowment effect of the baseline and by loss/no gain
characterisations. While the risk attitudes remain the same, I claim that the characterisation
of actions as instance of Bdoing^ rather than Ballowing^ is performing the explanatory work.
Kamm famously criticises the thesis that the doing/allowing distinction collapses into the loss/
no gain distinction, thus threatening themoral significance of the former.15 Kamm’s argument can
be summarized into two main claims: a) the doing/allowing distinction address a different aspect
than the loss/no gain distinction does, and thus the former can not be reduced to the latter; b) the
doing/allowing distinction, when properly characterised, is immune to framing effects.
When arguing in favour of a), Kamm starts with the observation that while losses and gains
are descriptions referring to end-states, doing and allowing have to do with the way an agent
brings about these end-states. As such, Bdoing^ and Ballowing^ univocally identify the
connection between the agent’s behaviour and the outcome. K&T’s and Horowitz’s analysis
of the BAsian flu^ case, in this sense, is misleading, as it does not account for this additional
feature of the doing/allowing characterisation with respect to the loss/no gain description.
Upon a closer look, Kamm argues, this example does not simply involve our different attitudes
with respect to gains and losses, but rather our different intuitions over what she defines as
unprevented losses and denied gains. In the first decision problem, indeed, agents are confronted
with a Bnearly death state^; the resulting lives saved with respect to the reference point are thus
perceived as gains, but of a specific kind that Kamm defines as Bmaintaining what one is close to
lose^.16 To see this point, we can imagine that when opting for ProgramA,we arguably think that
we are gaining 200 lives the Asian flu would instead take, if we do not act promptly. On the other
hand, the 400 lives lost are a Bno gain^which can be interpreted as a denied gain: i.e., with respect
to the nearly death state, failing to save everyone is merely not maintaining what we are close to
lose anyway if we do not act. On the other hand, the second decision problem sets the baseline as
Beveryone lives^. With respect to such situation, lives are framed as losses, Kamm defines as
Blosses which are happening independently of our intervention and which we fail to prevent^. To
be sure, unprevented losses seems less morally objectionable than imposed losses; nonetheless,
they are arguably more objectionable than denied gains. This distinction, she claims, explains
people’s different responses to the two decision problems.
What this analysis shows is that in the BAsian flu^ case the loss/no gain distinction does not
fully explain our characterisations of the actions in the first decision problem as Ballowing
harm^ and in the second decision problem as Bdoing harm^. The loss/no gain distinction,
indeed, does not capture the crucial element of human decision-making, or the issue of Bhow
the consequence is brought about^, which is extremely relevant in our doing/allowing
attributions. All the experimental findings support, therefore, is that agents are sensitive to
the agency-sensitive unprevented loss/denied gain effect, and perceive the same outcome
differently depending on whether the outcome is perceived as the result of a conduct framed
as the former rather than the latter.
I think that Kamm’s analysis is persuasive, and acknowledges for an issue I discussed in
section 2: there is more to the BAsian flu^ case than losing or gaining lives, as this choice
appears as morally significant. In this sense, we may be interested in question of permissibility,
responsibility or the like, which have to do with the way a consequence is brought about and
the agent’s intentions (denying a gain rather than failing to prevent an harm). Therefore, my
15 In this paper, I will not survey all the examples she employs as to argue her case, but I will only refer to the
BAsian flu^ case.
16 Kamm (2007), p. 473.
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hypothesis is perfectly consistent with claim a), as Kamm simply gives a specific and detailed
account of how the shift in the baseline affects the perception and characterisation of
behaviours, in a way that goes beyond mere gains and losses. Arguably, the doing/allowing
distinction is thought of to conflate with the loss/no gain effect because of the fact that, in most
cases, the two are difficult to disentangle, as doing harm often occur in cases where we suffer a
loss, and allowing harm in cases where we do not achieve a gain. More accurately, as Kamm
argues, it is quite difficult to design fully equalised cases, i.e., a pair of cases which is identical
under all respect but are only distinguishable in the fact that one addresses the doing/allowing
and the other the loss/no gain distinction. Such an example, however, would be required as to
show that, when the loss/no gain effect is controlled for, the doing/allowing distinction
disappears: this would prove, indeed, that there is nothing more to doing/allowing distinction
than the loss/no gain effect. All examples used by the advocates of the reductionist thesis,
however, seemingly share the same structure of the BAsian flu^ case: a closer inspection
reveals that there could be a further element in the deliberation, addressing the way the
outcome is brought about.
So far, Kamm has successfully argued that the doing/allowing distinction does not collapses
into the loss/no gain one, as the former does not only refer to end-states but also to how these end-
states are brought about. We could think that, in her jargon, instances of imposed or even
unprevented losses remind us more of Bdoing harm^, while instances of denied gains suggest a
characterisation of a conduct as Ballowing harm^. Reframing would then trigger perception of the
same action as doing rather than allowing, explaining the preference reversal consistently with
my hypothesis. Kamm, however, also argues that the doing/allowing distinction is not subject to
framing effects as the loss/no gain distinction is, thus completely defeating the master argument.
To appreciate Kamm’s argument, it is useful to come back to the notion of fully equalised
cases. Most counterexamples to the independence of the doing/allowing distinction, indeed,
appear to be, as the BAsian flu^ case, very confusing and misleading. According to Kamm, the
phrasing, or the order in which events are presented, tends to hide the real or salient moral
features of the case, thus inducing different moral judgements. Under a careful scrutiny,
however, we should still recognize that one judgement is more adequate, or reliable, than
the other, and thus Bbeat^ framing effects. As for the BAsian flu^ example, she argues, it is
more reasonable, once we think more thoroughly about it, to conclude that any choice of
vaccination plans would be an instance of allowing harm, rather than doing it. What is really
causing the harm, here, is indeed something independent from our intentions and we can not
possibly prevent: any bad consequence which would occur, therefore, should not be
characterised as doing harm. What happens in the second decision problem, therefore, would
be the result of a misleading reframing that fails to highlight this salient element of the choice
at issue, i.e., that deaths are not brought about by our intervention. Once this aspect is made
clear, arguably, the preference reversal will no longer be observed. The master argument would
then be untenable, as we could maintain that some intuitions are more adequate and reliable
than others, and these could serve a convincing account of the doing/allowing distinction.
I think Kamm’s conclusion here is not convincing, and that it fails to prove decisively that the
doing/allowing distinction is immune to framing effects. First, it is worth noticing that Kamm is able
to define both decision problems in the BAsian flu^ case as instances of Ballowing harm^ because
she relies on a prior definition of the distinction. Specifically, she refers to her Bself-ownership^
account, which states that a conduct classifies as Bdoing harm^ if it is intruding or imposing over
another individual’s body or possessions, while it is just an instance of Ballowing^ if this condition
does not hold when bringing about the harm. In this sense, whichever health plan we choose, we
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would not impinge on these people’s self-ownership, and thus we would not be doing any harm. I
believe, however, this argument amounts to a poor defence against the master argument, which
assumes that adequate accounts of the doing/allowing distinction should be inferred from our
intuitions about cases. If we already have a precise definition of the doing/allowing distinction, on
the other hand, we would be adopting a different perspective on moral theorising, one which, in
some sense, assigns a lesser role to our intuitions and insights. I will come back to this argument in
section 4, discussing the significance of framing for the doing/allowing distinction.
Secondly, I am not sure whether our intuitions over the two decision problems can be
dismissed as easily as Kamm claims. To be fair, as Horowitz’s analysis seems to suggest, there
could be at least disagreement over the characterisations of the conducts in the choice problem
C vs D as Ballowing^. Other examples discussed by Kamm as to support this conclusion, like
Schelling’s Tax case, seems to show as well the same Binstability^ across individuals, insofar
as there is a persistent disagreement over the correct evaluation of cases. In short, if my
analysis were, if not conclusive, at least reasonable, we could argue that different classifica-
tions are seemingly fair and equally justifiable for different individuals. What is more, we
might be still interested in an account of the doing/allowing distinction which explains the
experimental findings, rather than one which solves the issue by claiming that one frame is
more Bright^ than the other. In this sense, my hypothesis has the advantage of tracking how the
reframing of the decision problems affects the perception of one behaviour as denying a gain/
allowing harm rather than not preventing a loss/doing harm.
To sum up, my position is consistent with Kamm’s claim a) that the doing/allowing
distinction does not collapse into the loss/no gain distinction. We both agree that there is more
in the BAsian flu^ case than a different perception of outcomes as losses or no gains, and we
both identify it with a concern for the way the outcome is brought about. Specifically, Kamm
talks of denied gains and unprevented losses, a characterisation that is compatible with my
psychological explanation for the different risk attitudes with respect to doing and allowing
harm. I do not think, however, that Kamm succeeds into proving b), i.e., the fact that the doing/
allowing distinction is not subject to framing. The fact that the doing/allowing (or unprevented
loss/denied gain) distinction is different from the loss/no gain one, does not by itself rule out
that the former could still be subject to framing. The latter hypothesis, I argue, is compatible
with experimental findings and acknowledges for the instability of our intuitions and the
persistency of preference reversal and interpersonal disagreement.
1.4 Framing and the Master Argument
In this last section, I briefly discuss what my interpretation of the BAsian flu^ case entails for the
relevance of the doing/allowing distinction. As Kamm notices, we should be worried about
framing effects insofar as they threaten the reliability of our intuitions over moral categories and
principles, and, specifically, over the correct characterisation of actions as instances of doing rather
than allowing. I have argued above that Kamm’s answer to themaster argument fails, as it assumes
that we can somehow get rid of conflicting intuitions if we carefully reason upon cases and use the
Bcorrect^ frame, the one which highlights the Bright^ moral features. My objection to Kamm is
that this operation would only be possible if we already had an account of the doing/allowing
distinction, which would not thus be constructed upon our intuitions about specific cases.
My different interpretation, on the other hand, i.e., that doing/allowing is subject to framing,
leaves us vulnerable to the conclusion stated in the master argument, thus seriously threatening
the significance of the doing/allowing distinction as a guide to our moral judgements. In this
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sense, frame-dependecy should pose some serious questions to the way we commonsensically
think and reason from a moral perspective, as our moral reasoning would appear unreliable and
not always to pick up on relevant features.
My intuition here is that there is no need to infer such a radical conclusion from limited
examples like the BAsian flu^ case. As Kamm persuasively argues, these counterexamples usually
amount to very complex and difficult cases, where different effects and categorisations are mixed
up in intricate ways, and, more importantly, the decision problem has no clear-cut solution. In both
the choices between A and B and C and D, indeed, it is not self-evident that one option is morally
required and the other impermissible, as the amount of interpersonal disagreement reported by
experimental results shows. In these circumstances, I believe, agents try, throughout their deliber-
ations, to Bassimilate^ the choice they face with more clear-cut examples and moral principles. In
the BAsian flu^ case, the phrasing and the use of specific terms may remind us and appeal to
characterisations of Ballowing harm^ or Bdoing harm^ respectively. For this reason, we pick up
these cues and apply the principle Ballowing harm is not as morally wrong/objectionable as doing
harm^ as to make a decision.
The kind of reasoning illustrated above, arguably, is not subject to frame-dependency when
cases are well-defined and not as nuanced as the BAsian flu^ examples. In most circumstances,
therefore, framing should not affect the fact that we pick up the salient moral features, and will
hence tend to agree upon which courses of action are permissible or required. To sum up, we
might concede that our moral intuitions can generally be trusted, and can be used to build a
coherent account of the doing/allowing distinction, while at the same time admitting that, for
some of these Bborderline^ cases, framing effects could lead to different characterisations of
the decision problem, that subsequently trigger different moral responses.
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